That warning is from Vikram David Amar, Dean of the University of Illinois College of Law, a law professor who developed the idea behind the National Popular Vote interstate compact.1 NPV lobbyists make wild and false claims about their proposal. This website exposes the dangerous flaws of the NPV compact proposal:
Today, one state cannot sue another state to challenge its election process or results. NPV would change this by requiring states to use the election results from other states. For the first time, states would have justiciable interests in other states’ elections, leading to endless lawsuits and attempted meddling in elections across state lines.
States could sue other states.
The compact leaves the Electoral College in place but tries to force it to rubber stamp what member states determine is the popular vote result. Overlaying one system on another creates constitutional and practical conflicts.2
NPV manipulates the Electoral College.
States would use different laws, policies, and timelines for casting, counting, recounting, challenging, and reporting election results, which one of the law professors behind NPV warns would not produce a reliable result.3
The compact does not create a national election.
The compact does not create a commission or other coordinating agency to provide a unified result or deal with disputes. It is simply silent on recounts, contests, or conflicting results.
NPV does not provide a national result.
The NPV compact fails to create a single, definitive set of national results. Instead, each compact state certifies its own national results. If there are disputes or delays in any state’s election (as is common), these results could be different.4
States would certify their own “national” results.
The purpose of the compact is to require member states to ignore their own voters’ choice. This is legally and politically dubious and could lead to lawsuits and unrest.
NPV overturns state election results.
Determining a compact state’s national vote totals is left up to one state official. That person might, for political or other reasons, not accept results from one or more other states. The NPV compact says nothing about preventing or resolving such disputes.
A single official in each state would control all its electoral votes.
NPV leaves the Electoral College in place but tries to manipulate its result. Because it does not create a direct election, it does nothing to address concerns like faithless electors or questions about the role of Congress.5
NPV does not create a real popular vote.
The NPV compact is silent on recounts—an incredible oversight. If the national result is to be determinative, any recount must be national. Otherwise, states could selectively recount, or not, for political reasons. This appears to violate Supreme Court precedent, but NPV provides no alternative.6
Meaningful recounts would be impossible.
Past proposals to replace the Electoral College typically contain a runoff provision to prevent a candidate from winning with a small plurality—but NPV contains no such protection. This would encourage splinter parties and spoiler candidates, and could result in a winning candidate with narrow, regional support.7
The compact has no check on small-plurality winners.
Maine and Alaska use RCV in presidential elections, and other states are considering similar proposals. But RCV-adjusted results cannot be combined—the result is meaningless (similar to the mistake of adding percentages).8
NPV conflicts with ranked choice voting (RCV).
State constitutions generally impose a residency requirement for voting. Depending on how this is written, it may prohibit NPV, as when the Michigan Constitution expressly restricts voting for the state’s presidential electors to state residents.9
NPV violates some state constitutions.
States have passed resolutions condemning NPV and calling on their attorneys general to challenge it if other states attempt to put it into effect. Other states are considering such measures, or even laws that could interfere with the compact.10
Some states strongly oppose NPV.
The compact leaves in place all of the current potential for election contests and lawsuits, but creates additional conflicts by overturning state results based on votes from other states. It attempts to manipulate the Electoral College to do something explicitly rejected by the authors of the Constitution.11
NPV would increase state and federal lawsuits.
1 Sean Parnell, “Dangerous Gaps” in NPV Compact, SAVE OUR STATES (2020) at https://saveourstates.com/blog/dangerous-gaps-in-npv-compact; citing Vikram David Amar, Overcoming Partisan Objections to Electoral College Reform, VERDICT (2019) at https://verdict.justia.com/2019/04/18/overcoming-partisan-objections-to-electoral-college-reform.
2 Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional, BYU LAW REVIEW (2012) at https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2012/iss5/3/.
3 Trent England, NPV Founder Having Second Thoughts?, SAVE OUR STATES (2019) at https://saveourstates.com/blog/electoral-college-hijacker-having-second-thoughts.
4 Sean Parnell, New York Submits Inaccurate Presidential Vote Count (Again), Save Our States (2021) at https://saveourstates.com/blog/new-york-submits-inaccurate-presidential-vote-count-again. See also Election Emergencies Happen, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2021) at https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/5c12e057a6db45fa86968d1b01de5d5c.
5 Derek T. Muller, The Electoral College and the Federal Popular Vote, HARVARD LAW & POLICY REVIEW (2020) at https://harvardlpr.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2021/08/HLP103.pdf.
6 Sean Parnell, National Popular Vote: Recount Madness, SAVE OUR STATES (2020) at https://saveourstates.com/blog/national-popular-vote-recount-madness.
7 Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Sub-Constitutional Change, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL (2011) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786946.
8 Richard F. Potthoff, Clashes Involving National Popular Vote, Hare (“RCV”), Maine, Alaska, PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS (2021) at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/clashes-involving-national-popular-vote-hare-rcv-maine-alaska/AB088ED515CB890971129734D038AC88. See also Trent England, State RCV Laws Threaten NPV, Confuse its Supporters, SAVE OUR STATES (2021) at https://saveourstates.com/blog/state-rcv-laws-threaten-npv-confuse-its-supporters.
9 MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION OF 1963, article II, section 3, at http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-Article-II-3. See also Trent England, Some State Constitutions Prohibit NPV, SAVE OUR STATES (2021) at https://saveourstates.com/blog/some-state-constitutions-prohibit-npv.
10 Jack Dura, North Dakota lawmakers put study into bill opposing presidential popular vote movement, THE BISMARCK TRIBUNE (2021) at https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/north-dakota-lawmakers-put-study-into-bill-opposing-presidential-popular-vote-movement/article_eefd074f-ad4f-5fbf-95eb-67f325477dc4.html. See also Can Non-Member States Thwart the NPV Compact?, SAVE OUR STATES at https://saveourstates.com/uploads/Non-member-states.pdf.
11 Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional, BYU LAW REVIEW (2012) at https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2012/iss5/3/.
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